Teletext, Airtours and the Battle to Control the Lates Market

In the 1990s, the biggest challenge for every vertically integrated tour operator was not selling the first 60% of its holidays, but clearing the final 40%, which were sold within three months of departure, often at a loss and minimising these losses was one of my key jobs.

To clear stock, we priced by flight and created “Sun Deals” or generic offers described by destination, board basis and star rating, where customers did not know the name of their hotel until they arrived at the airport and were bussed to it.

Because these deals were generic, they didn't require glossy brochures or enticing hotel photography, creating ideal conditions for one of the strangest sales channels the travel industry has ever used: Teletext.

Unlike retail shops, the call centres that sold via Teletext were open until 10 pm, letting people plan last-minute holidays from the comfort of their couches. Customers pressed the Red Text button while watching ITV and waited as pages of holiday prices and telephone numbers scrolled across the television screen.

Compared with today’s internet, the technology was laughably basic. Advertisers needed specialist updaters who understood its peculiar coding structure and could construct an offer that grabbed attention during the 5 seconds before the screen moved on. Operators could commit to an annual price for a Numbered section such as Page 199, which they could then promote in brochures or newspaper adverts, or buy space on premium sections such as Bargains of the Day or Canary Islands Deals.

The £99 headline holidays were not always available unless somebody was prepared to travel almost immediately, but that was not really the point. The price generated the telephone call, after which a skilled salesperson could switch the customer into a more suitable, and normally more expensive, departure.

That £20 reduction sounds insignificant today, but it transformed call volumes and gave participating agents a major advantage. It also cost Airtours remarkably little because the extra demand allowed me to increase prices through other agents, balancing the targeted discount while improving our ability to clear distressed stock.

Once I explained the importance of controlling late-sales distribution to David Crossland, he understandably decided to reduce Airtours’ exposure by buying Late Escapes, then the largest Teletext holiday player. The deal left my friend and founder, John McLean, around £20 million richer, but control subsequently passed to Tony Bennett’s Going Places operation, which refused to continue matching my £10 funding.

Rather than surrender our control over this channel, I got Peter Rothwell’s approval, hired a huge Manchester office, and recruited about 200 agents to create Go Direct, later rebranded as Holiday Line.

But the decision caused an almighty row at PLC board level.

Peter and I were summoned to Parkway, where I reminded David that he had bought Going Places precisely because Airtours needed secure distribution, and that if my own retailer could threaten to turn off Airtours Late Sales unless I accepted higher commission demands, I had no choice but to build an alternative.

David was furious, but he also recognised that Airtours had been built by encouraging entrepreneurial behaviour rather than suppressing it. The new operation had secured scarce and valuable Teletext capacity and was expected to contribute an additional £500,000 in its first year to group profits. In fact, it ultimately made millions, particularly once we promoted direct-booking telephone numbers throughout Airtours brochures, much to the annoyance of high street retailers, whom we were effectively turning into direct-sale brochure warehouses; but they still needed the brochures, so had little choice but to rack them. So, David’s fury eventually turned into a nice double bonus for me that year.

Teletext looked primitive, but commercially it was revolutionary. It separated selling from the brochure, turned price into an immediate response mechanism, and showed that controlling customer demand could be as important as controlling aircraft, hotels, or travel shops.

The screen may have been crude, but the distribution lesson remains entirely relevant in today’s AI-driven travel market.